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1. INTRODUCTION
Judge Richard Posner claims that the application of economic
analysis to legal issues may be "the most important development
in legal thought in the last quarter century."! Certainly the ability
to use economic analysis as a mechanism for conceptualizing
legal problems has made an enormous impact on legal academia.
In particular, the application of economic analysis to legal issues
has had a substantial impact on our ability to understand cases.
The critical and unanswered question, however, is whether the
application of economic principles to legal issues has had any
effect on the outcomes of cases. Put another way, Posner and
others in the Law and Economics Movement (including muself)
who champion the use of economic analysis in judicial decision-
making have not confronted the question of the proper relation-
ship between economic and legal analysis. Mter all, ifone begins
with the premise that the law should reach efficient outcomes,
then one must confront the question ofwhy economic reasoning
should not displace legal reasoning as the principal method by
which legal rules are formulated and evaluated by common-law
judges.
My thesis is that, despite the massive attention that has been
given in the literature to the economic analysis of law, the Law
and Economics Movement has had little effect on the methodol-
ogy by which cases are decided. Ironically, there is an economic
explanation for the fact that traditional common-law reasoning
continues to dominate the judicial decision-making process. The
argument is simple. Economic reasoning has not replaced legal
reasoning because traditional legal analysis provides a more effi-
cient method for deciding cases than does modern economic
analysis.
Moreover, I will argue that traditional legal reasoning in many
areas of the law is not appreciably different from economic rea-
soning. The rhetoric is different, of course, but the analysis is the
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same. Finally, I will argue that the analysis in this article has im-
portant implications for the use of economic analysis in resolving
disputes. 'I will show that economic analysis is a substitute for
traditional analysis. Traditional legal analysis continues to domi-
nate economic analysis in resolving disputes because it is more
efficient.
This article uses economic analysis to explain why legal reason-
ing dominates economic reasoning as a methodological tool for
deciding cases, and to explore some of the implications of this
insight. The article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I discuss
the differences between legal and economic reasoning. In Part
III, I explain the efficiency characteristics of legal and economic
reasoning to explain why it is efficient for the former to domi-
nate the latter in judicial decision-making. Finally, in Part IV I
discuss the role of economic analysis in a world where legal rea-
soning is more efficient than economic reasoning.
II. LEGAL REAsONING AND ECONOMIC REAsONING
Commentators generally fail to understand that legal reason-
ing and economic reasoning simply employ different methodolo-
gies to deal with the same problem and achieve similar goals.
This common problem concerns the question of how to allocate
resources and responsibilities in a society characterized by con-
stant conflict and scarcity. The two recurring themes in both
legal and economic reasoning concern how to create appropri-
ate incentives to guide the people who are subject to a particular
set of legal rules into reaching efficient outcomes. Efficiency is
traditionally defined as the state ofaffairs that exists under which
no changes can be made to improve the condition of one per-
son, or group of people, without diminishing the condition of
another person or group.
The difference between economic and legal reasoning is that
economic reasoning attempts to deal with issues like incentives
and efficiency directly, while legal reasoning rarely uses these
terms explicitly. Instead, judges generally employ looser, more
general terms like "justice," "fairness," and "equity" to explain
their reasoning. Despite these rhetorical differences, however,
economic concepts dominate legal reasoning.
The implicit use of economic concepts in legal reasoning is
quite obvious in some contexts. For example, in United States v.
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Carroll Towing Co.,2Judge Learned Hand was faced with the most
basic issue in the law of torts; namely, the standard to be applied
in a lawsuit alleging negligence. The economic problem here re-
sults from the fact that the benefits of preventing accidents must
be balanced against both the costs of employing safety precau-
tions and the probability of an accident occurring. It makes little
economic sense to spend $100 to prevent an accident that will
cause $100 in damage, if there is only a two percent chance that
the $100 in damage will ever occur. The negligence formula de-
vised byJudge Hand in Carroll Towingreaches the efficient result.
The case involved a vessel that broke away from its moorings.
Without mentioning the economic goals of efficiency or incen-
tive creation, Judge Hand opined that:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from
her moorings, and since, ifshe does, she becomes a menace to
those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situa-
tions, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the bur-
den of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this
notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liabil-
ity depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P, i.e.,
whether B < PL.3
Proper application of the Hand Formula will lead to efficient
risk-taking. Precautions against injury are only required where
the marginal benefit of taking precautions outweighs the margi-
nal costs. This creates the appropriate incentives for all economic
actors. Interestingly, a judge with no formal training reached the
economically correct result using common-law reasoning
processes instead of economic analysis. Moreover, as Posner has
observed, judges have been reaching the economically correct re-
sults in tort cases ever since the doctrine of negligence was
introduced.4
Here it is obvious that economic reasoning and legal reasoning
not only produce the same results, but also involve the same anal-
ysis, albeit with different nomenclatures. This is also true in fields
like antitrust, where economic analysis has explicitly become part
of the law. Yet the analysis also holds true in fields such as con-
2. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
3. ld. at 173.
4. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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tracts, property law, and criminal law, where the use of economic
analysis by judges is less obvious.
The relationship between economic analysis and the law of
contracts is obvious. Economic analysis emphasizes the fact that
exchanges should be encouraged because they benefit con-
tracting parties by allowing goods and services to be transferred
to higher-valuing users. These benefits to the contracting parties
result from the fact that exchanges allow people to obtain assets
that they value more highly than the assets they have given up.
Society benefits through this process by increasing employment
and providing people with incentives to be productive. The ec~
nomic function of the law of contracts is to encourage exchanges
by fashioning a set of fixed and clear legal rules to reduce the
transaction costs that burden the contracting process.
Because information is costly to acquire, and future contingen-
cies are difficult to anticipate, parties will not find it cost-effective
to specify their respective rights and obligations completely when
they enter into contracts. The basic purpose of contract law is to
fill the gaps in the contracts that people make, by"reproduc[ing]
what the parties would have agreed to if they could have
costlessly planned for the event initially."5
Thus, for example, in Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar
Molasses CO.,6 the plaintiff had contracted to purchase "approxi-
mately 1,500,000 wine gallons Refined Blackstrap [molasses] of
the usual run from the National Sugar Refinery, Yonkers, N.y."7
The defendant was an intermediary, who was to purchase the
sugar from the National Sugar Refinery and deliver it to the
plaintiff in Canada. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the National
Sugar Refinery produced only 485,848 gallons of syrup; far less
than was expected. This under-production caused the defendant,
Dunbar Molasses Company, to breach the contract. In deciding
the case Judge Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Ap-
peals, inquired into the allocation of risk among the parties:
The defendant does not even show that it tried to get a con-
tract from the refinery during the months that intervened be-
tween the acceptance of the plaintiff's order and the time
when shipments were begun. It has wholly failed to relieve it-
self of the imputation of contributory fault. So far as the record
5. A. MITCHELL POUNSKY. AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 27 (2d ed. 1989).
6. 179 N.E. 383 (N.Y. 1932).
7. Id. at 397.
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shows, it put itsfaith in the mere chance that the output ofthe refinery
would be the samefrom year to year, and finding itsfaith vain, it tells
us that its customer must have expected to take a chance as great. We
see no reason for importing into the bargain this aleatory ele-
ment. The defendant is in no better position than a factory
who undertakes in his own name to sell for future delivery a
special mill. The duty will be discharged if the mill is destroyed
before delivery is due.8
In other words, the parties failed to specify ex ante who should
bear the risk of this particular contingency: a diminution in pro-
duction by the National Sugar Refinery. Reasoning from struc-
ture and relationship, however, the court decided that the
parties must have expected that the defendant would bear this
risk. First, the court noted that the plaintiff could have con-
tracted directly with the National Sugar Refinery but declined to
do so. Moreover, the court noted that the defendant could have
eliminated its risk by entering into a contract with the refinery
after it had reached its agreement with the plaintiff. Clearly the
plaintiff would have gotten a windfall if the price of syrup had
declined precipitously. Thus, by parity of reasoning, the plaintiff
should have borne the risk on the down-side as well, suffering as
a result of the diminution in supply. This result is efficient and
perfectly consistent with economic principles, although no refer-
ence to economic analysis is made anywhere in the opinion.
Other aspects of legal reasoning in contract law similarly in-
volve efficiency criteria. For example, in Bach v. Long IslandJewish
Hospital,9 an emancipated infant contracted to have cosmetic sur-
gery and then attempted to disaffirm her consent after the opera-
tion was performed. The court held that the infant had received
the full benefit of her bargain and would not be permitted to
avoid payment. This result is efficient because it prevents con-
tracting parties from acting opportunistically by contracting and
then reneging on the contract based on a pre-existing condition
known to them at the time. A contrary result in such cases would
reduce societal welfare by denying all emancipated infants the
opportunity to enter into beneficial exchanges. Similarly, con-
tractual problems involving such disparate issues as non-
simultaneity of performance, coercion, fraud, mistake, and dam-
8. [d. at 199-200 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
9. 267 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 1966).
HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 112 1994
112 Harvar4Journal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 17
ages all have been resolved byjudges in ways fully consistent with
economic principles.10
The economic principles utilized in property law are also
designed to maximize societal wealth. Indeed, market exchanges,
a critical feature of a market-oriented economic system, would
not be possible without private property.Just as contract law facil-
itates bargaining by establishing the ground rules for exchanges,
property law facilitates bargaining by establishing the contours
for legal entitlements, thereby creating incentives to use re-
sources efficiently.ll
Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five Inc.,12 presents a
striking example of the symbiotic relationship between economic
and legal principles. Two neighboring hotels enjoyed views of
the Atlantic Ocean and the promise of lots of Florida sunshine
for their guests. The Fountainbleau proposed to add a significant
addition to its main building in the form of a 14-story tower that
would extend 130 feet above grade. This addition would en-
shroud the cabana, swimming pool; and sunbathing areas of the
Eden Roc in shade every afternoon.
The court dismissed Eden Roc's complaint on the ground that,
absent a statutory or contractual obligation, it had no legal right
to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land so long
as the obstruction being constructed "serves a useful and benefi-
cial purpose."13 This case presents a straightforward application
of the Coase Theorem: Absent transaction costs, parties will bar-
gain for an efficient allocation of property rights irrespective of
the initial allocation of such rights by the legal system.14
There are three economic issues underlying the simpl,e fact
pattern in the Fountainbleau case. The first concerns the question
of the efficient allocation of property rights as between the
Fountainbleau and the Eden Roc. In order for the outcome to
have been efficient, the increase in value to the Fountainbleau
from the construction of the addition must have been greater
than the diminution in value to the Eden Roc. If this was the
case, the court reached the efficient outcome. On the other
hand, if the diminution in value to the Eden Roc was greater
10. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 79-125.
11. Id. at 30.
12. 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
13. Id. at 359.
14. RONALD H. CoASE, THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL Cosr, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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than the increase in value to the Fountainbleau, the result
reached was inefficient.
However, consistent with the Coase Theorem, the allocation of
property rights by the courts would not have prevented the par-
ties from reaching an efficient outcome. This is because the
Eden Roc simply could have paid the Fountainbleau to decline
to proceed with its proposed addition. Thus, the second eco-
nomic issue in the case concerns the transaction costs that must
be overcome by two firms in order for them to bargain to an
efficient outcome. In Fountainbleau, the costs do not appear to
have been high.
In this regard, it is interesting that a complaint was ever filed in
this case in the first place. Clearly, Eden Roc must have thought
that it had at least some small chance of winning its lawsuit, or it
never would have commenced litigation. This litigation repre-
sented a waste of real resources, which would not have occurred
if the legal rules had been clear. Thus, in this respect, the
Fountainbleau case represents a failure of the legal system, albeit a
small one.
The final economic issue in this case concerns the problem of
strategic behavior. Suppose that, instead of constructing an addi-
tion to its hotel, the Fountainbleau proposed simply to erect a
giant tower-whose sole function was to block the Eden Roc's
view-just to extract a side payment from Eden Roc in exchange
for Fountainbleau's agreement not to construct the tower. In
such a context, a court's function would be to prevent strategic
behavior. The court in Fountainbleau did this by requiring that
the structure being built had to serve a useful and beneficial
purpose.
From these three economic issues follow three economic les-
sons to be learned from Fountainbleau. First, economic analysis,
in the form of the Coase Theorem, shows that to reach an effi-
cient allocation of resources, there is no need for courts to in-
quire into which party to a lawsuit most values the assets in
dispute, at least where private bargaining is possible. Second, the
court does have an important role to play. This role consists of
articulating clear legal rules that the parties can use as a back-
ground to support their bargaining. Finally, the Fountainbleau
case shows that the courts have an additional role to play in prop-
erty rights litigation. This role consists of reducing the incidence
of opportunistic behavior in society by making sure that people
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do not engage in activities designed simply to extort side-pay-
ments from other parties.
III. THE EFFICIENCY OF LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REAsONING
The purpose of the above discussion has been to provide some
insight into the relationship between legal and economic reason-
ing. As noted, legal analysis, like economic analysis, is concerned
with the allocation of rights and responsibilities in society. This
insight is more controversial than it may first appear. Generally,
advocates of the Law and Economics School have assumed that
economic analysis is a complement to legal analysis. By contrast, it
would appear that, in many contexts, economic analysis is a sub-
stitute for legal analysis. In this regard, using both economic and
legal analysis to solve the same problem might be wastefully du-
plicative. In such situations, the task is to determine which meth-
odology is more efficient at problem-solving. Here I will argue
that it is clear that traditional legal analysis is more efficient at
legal problem-solving than is economic analysis. As a science, ec-
onomics is primarily concerned with posing questions, devising
theories, and testing hypotheses. While this process of formulat-
ing questions is interesting and important, economic analysis
does not purport to supply answers to discrete legal problems.
First, as any economist will tell you, information is costly to
produce. The high costs of producing information require that
lawsuits often will be decided on the basis of incomplete informa-
tion. For example, suppose that a court is trying to determine
whether a particular criminal defendant is innocent. One type of
error consists of letting a guilty person go free. The other type of
error consists of convicting an innocent person. There is a trade-
off involved in choosing between these two types of error. By set-
ting high standards of proof, we can reduce the chances of the
second type of error, but we will increase the incidence of the
first type. Similarly, by lowering the evidentiary standards, we re-
duce the first type of error at the expense of the second. This, of
course, will result in additional guilty persons going free. Eco-
nomic theory can elucidate the problem, but it does not help us
choose what standard of proof is best. Ultimately, the legal stan-
dard to be used requires a value judgment based on the costs of
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis (that is, the hypothesis
that the defendant is innocent). Economic analysis is not particu-
larly useful in reaching this value judgment.
HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 115 1994
No.1] Influence ofEconomic Analysis 115
In other words, economic theory cannot supply the value judg-
ments necessary to implenent its own insights. The legal system
must do so, and it does. In addition, information problems in the
real world often make it impossible to supply the quantitative in-
formation necessary to implement other insights. For example,
as noted above,15 in deciding a simple negligence case, a judge
must estimate not only the amount of damage caused by the de-
fendant, but also what it would have cost the defendant to pre-
vent that damage, as well as the ex ante probability that the
accident would occur. While it might be possible to quantify
these calculations with more specificity than is currently done, it
would be costly to do so. The additional estimation costs might
not be worth the benefits, which come in the form of more effi-
cient behavior by both defendants and plaintiffs. Economic the-
ory itself explains why it is not desirable to require that such costs
be incurred. Economic analysis indicates that the parties to a
negligence action should devote resources to the litigation until
the marginal benefits from such expenditures just equal the mar-
ginal costs. Thus, the parties themselves will spend the efficient
amount of money to establish their cases without government
coercion.
Statutes of limitation provide a good example of the way that
the legal system responds to information problems. These stat-
utes prevent people from bringing lawsuits after a certain
amount of time has expired. Thus, as Posner has pointed out,16
the statutes reduce the error costs associated with the use of stale
evidence. Statutes of limitation are useful where the parties to
legal disputes do not internalize all of the costs of bringing litiga-
tion. Because litigation may not be fully priced, statutes of limita-
tion serve as a crude but effective mechanism for rationing
inefficient disputes.
The most important reason that economic analysis has not re-
placed legal analysis in the judicial process is that legal analysis
often is a more efficient mechanism for resolving disputes than
economic analysis. Ironically, the (marginal) cost-benefit analysis
that characterizes much economic analysis generally does not
consider the costs associated with the analysis itself. By contrast,
legal analysis is overwhelmingly concerned with these costs. Is-
sues ranging from burdens of proof in trials, lengths of statutes
15. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
16. POSNER, supra note I, at 554.
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of limitations, the imposition of legally mandated "reasonable
person" standards for evaluating defendants' conduct, and the
state statutes of frauds in contract law all can be explained as
legal devices for economizing on information costs.
The most significant way that the legal system economizes on
information costs involves the use of such legal inventions as pre-
cedent and the canons of statutory construction in legal decision-
making. Absent information costs, these doctrines are difficult to
explain. This is because in the absence of information costs,
judges simply would decide each case in such a way as to reach an
efficient result. High information costs, however, make it difficult
for judges to do this. Reliance on the canons of statutory con-
struction and prior precedent allows judges to reach decisions in
cases involving areas of the law in which they have little or no
substantive expertise.17 Economic science, on the other hand,
provides no similar mechanism by which economists specializing
in labor economics could decide cases involving principles of,
say, corporate finance.
Put another way, such techniques of legal reasoning as inter-
preting statutes in the Hart and Sacks tradition18 and applying
traditional rules regarding the use of judicial precedents allow
judges to reach efficient outcomes in legal disputes without mas-
tering either the economics or the substantive legal rules relating
to a dispute. By contrast, ifjudges attempted to decide cases us-
ing economic analysis, they would have to familiarize themselves
with an astonishing number of highly specialized disciplines in
addition to basic microeconomics. These additional specialties
include econometrics, corporate finance, labor economics, in-
dustrial organization, and public choice, to name a few.
IV. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN LEGAL
DECISIONMAKING
Thus, ironically, the application of basic economic principles
to the process ofjudging may indicate that, as the world becomes
more complex, decisionmakers need to economize the process
ofjudging. As economics becomes more specialized, its relevance
17. SeeJonathan R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons ofStatutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 660-61 (1992).
18. For a discussion ofhowjudges reach efficient outcomes in cases involving statutory
interpretation using the Hart and Sacks approach to cases, seeJonathan R Macey, Promot-
ing Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode~ 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
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to judicial decision-making is likely to decline, not increase. By
contrast, the use of legal decision-making strategies such as stare
decisis and the canons ofstatutory construction, which economize
on information costs, is likely to increase as decisionmaking be-
comes more complex. Of course, in high stakes cases, it will pay
for the parties to employ experts; but their task will be to inform
laymenjudges, and not simply to converse with equally sophisti-
cated economistjudges.
v. CONCLUSION
Economics involves the study of markets. In many respects, the
legal system is nothing other than a market in which the state
creates rights and entitlements that parties can use to facilitate
bargaining. Economic analysis can do a great deal to improve
our understanding of the way that the market for legal rules
works, but it is of only limited use in actually deciding cases.
Thus, judges trained in traditional legal analysis need not worry
that they will be replaced by economists. .
Judge Posner has written that "[i]t would not be surprising to
find that many legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings to-
ward efficiency.»19 This article indicates that it is inaccurate to
call common-law judicial doctrines inarticulate. Judges simply
use a different mode of discourse than do economists to accom-
plish precisely the same ends. Thus, Posner's description of
judges as inarticulate misses the point that judges simply are
speaking a different language than economists. Both judges and
lawyers attempt to achieve what economists would call efficient
outcomes. Judges a.'1d lawyers speak in terms of justice, equity,
and fairness rather than efficiency. Yet these terms produce re-
sults that correspond to economists' ideas of efficiency. Further-
more, the methodology employed to reach these results is highly
efficient, because it economizes on information costs. That is why
legal reasoning dominates economic reasoning in our legal
system.
19. POSNER, supra note 1, at 21.
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